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Abstract 
The purpose of this deliverable is to provide an analysis of MAFTIA’s intrusion tolerance 
capabilities at an architectural level. We first summarise the various architectural concepts 
and mechanisms that MAFTIA has developed for constructing intrusion tolerant systems. We 
then present a realistic “use case” for the MAFTIA architecture, based on a simplified but 
realistic e-commerce application. Using a methodology based on fault trees, we provide a 
representative but by no means complete set of attack scenarios, which we then analyse in 
order to highlight the ways in which MAFTIA’s architectural mechanisms support the 
construction of intrusion tolerant Internet applications. Finally, we conclude the document 
with a discussion of the overall MAFTIA approach to achieving intrusion tolerance, 
identifying the key architectural components, and highlighting areas for future research. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The MAFTIA project has developed a range of mechanisms and protocols for building 
intrusion tolerant systems. The purpose of this deliverable is to demonstrate and evaluate 
MAFTIA’s intrusion tolerance capabilities at an architectural level by demonstrating their 
effectiveness in a hypothetical yet practical setting. To this end, the analysis is based on a 
simplified but realistic e-commerce application, TRADEZONE, originally described as a 
possible use case for MAFTIA in [MAFTIA 2000], and further elaborated herein. 
This deliverable presents the results of this evaluation, and is intended to complement 
MAFTIA deliverables D21 [Powell & Stroud 2003] and D22 [Adelsbach & Creese 2003], 
which together describe the concepts and principles underpinning the MAFTIA architecture, 
and present a variety of techniques for ensuring and evaluating MAFTIA’s intrusion tolerance 
capabilities. 
The evaluation work described in this document was performed in three major phases: 
i. An information-gathering phase, summarising MAFTIA’s collective design 
principles, its technical artefacts, and its system dependability assumptions, with 
specific reference to open (Internet) distributed systems intrusion tolerance; 
ii. An analysis phase, identifying a representative set of MAFTIA’s intrusion tolerance 
capabilities, the defences it provides against attackers, including hypothesised attacks 
with fault-tree analyses, presenting the likely actions of an attacker attempting to 
manipulate an intrusion tolerant MAFTIA-compliant TRADEZONE application; 
iii. A summary phase, presenting a synopsis of the analysis - covering the effectiveness 
of MAFTIA’s countermeasures against example system intrusions, together with an 
indication, where appropriate, of future research directions needed to improve or add 
to MAFTIA’s intrusion tolerance capabilities. 
The results of our evaluation are presented in the rest of this deliverable as follows. Chapter 2 
contains a summary of the various architectural concepts and mechanisms that MAFTIA has 
developed for constructing intrusion tolerant systems. Chapter 3 presents a realistic “use case” 
for the MAFTIA architecture, based on a simplified but realistic e-commerce application. 
Using a methodology based on fault trees, we provide a representative but by no means 
complete set of attack scenarios, which we then analyse in order to highlight the ways in 
which MAFTIA’s architectural mechanisms support the construction of intrusion tolerant 
Internet applications. Chapter 4 contains a discussion of the overall MAFTIA approach to 
achieving intrusion tolerance, identifying the key architectural components and design 
principles highlighted by the analysis in Chapter 3, and Chapter 5 concludes the document, 
identifying areas for future research. 
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Chapter 2 An overview of MAFTIA’s approach to building 
intrusion-tolerant systems 
Whilst most of the information presented in this section is scattered throughout the various 
MAFTIA deliverables, and the many other documents they reference, it is considered useful 
here to provide a reference summary of MAFTIA’s principles and techniques for the purpose 
of assisting the reader throughout the analysis and discussion in the rest of this document. 
2.1 Principles of intrusion tolerance 
A dependable system [Avizienis et al. 2001] is defined as one that is able to deliver a service 
that can justifiably be trusted; attributes of dependability include availability (readiness for 
correct service), reliability (continuity of correct service), confidentiality (prevention of 
unauthorised disclosure of information), and integrity (absence of improper system state 
alterations). Security is the concurrent existence of a) availability for authorized users only, 
b) confidentiality, and c) integrity, with ‘improper’ taken as meaning ‘unauthorized’. 
MAFTIA uses fault tolerance techniques to build dependable systems that are intrusion 
tolerant, that is, able to continue providing a secure service, despite the presence of malicious 
faults, i.e. deliberate attacks on the security of the system. Such faults are perpetrated by 
attackers who make unauthorised attempts to access, modify, or destroy information in a 
system, and/or to render the system unreliable or unusable. Attacks are facilitated by 
vulnerabilities, which are faults in the requirements, specification, design, implementation, 
and/or configuration of a system. A successful attacker is said to be an intruder, and a 
successful attack results in an intrusion upon the system. 
MAFTIA distinguishes between attacks, vulnerabilities, and intrusions as three types of 
interrelated faults [Powell & Stroud 2003]: 
• attack: a malicious interaction fault, through which an attacker aims to 
deliberately violate one or more security properties; an intrusion attempt. 
• vulnerability: a fault created during development of the system, or during 
operation, that could be exploited to create an intrusion. 
• intrusion: a malicious, externally-induced fault resulting from an attack that has 
been successful in exploiting a vulnerability. 
The related concepts of intrusion tolerance and intrusion detection are defined as follows: 
• intrusion detection: the set of practices and mechanisms used towards detecting 
errors that may lead to security failure, and diagnosing intrusions and attacks. 
• intrusion tolerance: the means to provide a service implementing the system function 
despite intrusions. 
Attacks may be viewed either at the level of the human activity of the attacker, or at the level 
of the resulting technical activity observable within the considered computer system: 
• attack (human): a malicious human interaction fault whereby an attacker aims to 
deliberately violate one or more security properties; 
• attack (technical): a malicious technical interaction fault aiming to exploit a 
vulnerability as a step to achieving the final aim of the attack. 
In general, an intrusion can result whenever an attacker is successful in exploiting a 
vulnerability with respect to any mechanism of a system. If that intrusion is not tolerated, then 
this can lead to a failure of the mechanism, which could in turn introduce a vulnerability in 
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other parts of the system that depend on the mechanism, allowing the original attack that 
caused the intrusion to propagate further into the system. 
In its provision of intrusion-tolerance strategies and techniques, MAFTIA builds on the 
successful work of others, but provides additional strategies and techniques of its own. 
One such earlier work was DELTA-4 – an EU-funded research project [Powell et al. 1988]. 
DELTA-4 was one of the first attempts to build a fully functional distributed, secure and 
robust replicated system. It developed a general architecture for dependable distributed 
systems. Part of the architecture [Deswarte et al. 1991] provided intrusion-tolerant services 
for data storage with secured access to authenticated, authorised users. Secrecy was afforded 
by encryption and data fragmentation, and availability by replicated data fragments. Secret 
encryption key sharing was supported, but no computations on shared secrets or robust 
protocols were implemented. DELTA-4 assumed a synchronous communications network. 
It is instructive to briefly revisit the principles and techniques of fault tolerance here because 
they are directly relevant to MAFTIA and its philosophy for addressing the issues of intrusion 
tolerance.  
MAFTIA, as in DELTA-4, applies the principles of fault tolerance to achieve its lines of 
defence against adversaries; namely, error processing [Avizienis 1967] and fault treatment 
[Anderson & Lee 1981]. Error processing (comprising error detection, damage detection, 
damage confinement, and error recovery) is aimed at removing errors from the computational 
state, if possible, before failure occurrence. Fault treatment is aimed at preventing previous 
faults from being exploited, and thereby inhibiting the success of similar attacks. 
These principles when applied to systems comprising redundant hardware and software 
components can be supported by manifold techniques: 
• self-checking computations (capable of detecting anomalous events in expected 
program behaviour) and agreement protocols with majority voting (capable of 
achieving  error recovery through fault masking); 
• threshold-cryptography (capable of reducing the risk of compromising secret 
cryptographic keys by using split key management), design diversity (capable of 
providing functionally equivalent computations with dissimilar design and 
implementations to disallow an attacker from exploiting the same vulnerability in a 
replicated component), and synchronous and asynchronous network 
communication protocols (capable of reliable ordered atomic broadcast and secure 
causal atomic broadcast for general Byzantine agreement, with strong defences 
against attacker interference); 
and finally, 
• capability-based authorisation services (capable of restricting access to all system 
service users according to the “least privilege” principle). 
These principles and techniques form the basis of the MAFTIA architecture and its approach 
to intrusion tolerance, as reviewed in Section 2.3.    
2.2 Attacker profiles 
MAFTIA classifies attackers according to their privileges with respect to the system: 
Outsiders who have no given system security privileges 
This is the most publicised type of attacker, but possibly not the most important, since he 
or she must successfully grapple with and bypass both the physical and logical security 
capabilities of a supposedly secure system - even though in current Internet applications 
the success of this type of attack is becoming all too frequent!  
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This kind of attacker doesn’t possess legitimate “login” capabilities to any external 
firewalls or internal hosts of the system. Associated attacks will try to bypass the 
capabilities of the firewall systems, the Internet and its application services, the operating 
system and its utilities, and the middleware and its encapsulated applications - each attack 
in turn to whatever extent the attacker is able. 
Once the attacker has succeeded in intruding upon a system by exploiting a vulnerability 
that can be targeted from outside the system, he or she will attempt to exploit further 
vulnerabilities in order to continue the attack. For example, a buffer overflow attack on a 
Web service application might allow the attacker to gain access to the “root” privileges of 
a host, and thereby enable him or her to cause further intrusions in the middleware or 
application services. There might even be opportunities for the attacker to install 
operating system kernel root-kits that provide all or selected operating system privileges, 
whilst concealing the presence of the attacker within the system. 
An attacker may also try to exploit existing trust relationships between users and hosts in 
the system, for example, by modifying DNS caches to allow host site spoofing. 
Following a successful attack, the intruder might plant Trojan horses, logic bombs, or 
some other trapdoor mechanisms into the system, and thereby facilitate further 
opportunities for later attacks. A clever attacker will invariably attempt to erase any trace 
of his or her tracks to conceal their intrusions. 
Insiders who have specific but limited system security privileges  
This type of attacker attempts to extend his or her privileges by discovering 
vulnerabilities in the system’s security defences, and thus gain access to unauthorised 
services. 
Such attackers have legitimate “login” access to specific protected facilities of the system, 
and are, therefore, potentially much more powerful than intrusive outsiders. They may 
have legitimate access to insecure scripts and faulty administrative services that are not 
accessible to outsiders, and may therefore be able to exploit vulnerabilities in these 
internal mechanisms. 
Malicious system security administrators who have extensive security privileges 
This type of attacker abuses their extensive and legitimate rights by performing 
illegitimate actions that violate the system’s security policy - clearly, the most dangerous 
kind of intruder! 
In order to prevent this kind of attack, it is necessary to ensure that no single administrator 
has complete control over critical parts of system Thus, one way to safeguard against this 
kind of abuse is to ensure that a system’s security duties and associated obligations can 
only be performed collectively by multiple, independent, non-colluding, administrators. 
2.3 MAFTIA’s capabilities for intrusion tolerance 
Intrusion tolerance is concerned with ensuring that a system continues to provide security 
guarantees in spite of partially successful attacks. Five specific capabilities are identified:  
(i) intrusion detection; (ii) group communication protocols based on generalised adversary 
structures; (iii) cryptographic techniques; (iv) data fragmentation and scattering; and finally, 
(v) access control. Collectively, these capabilities provide greater strength against intrusions 
than each method alone. 
Each of these intrusion tolerance capabilities is now described in more detail. Their 
application to a realistic application scenario is examined in the next chapter. 
Intrusion detection - aimed at detecting different kinds of system misuse and abuse. 
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These methods are based on the hypothesis that system security violations can be detected by 
monitoring a system’s activities in real-time, and by auditing a system’s activities in post-
mortem time. They are designed to detect anomalous system behaviour, hopefully soon 
enough to prevent attackers from realising significant system damage. Whilst not always 
successful in this regard, they also have a useful role to play in providing monitored 
information for later system behavioural analysis, needed to assist in the human determination 
of system intrusions and possible countermeasures. 
MAFTIA defines a sensor-based model for the detection and prevention of system attacks. It 
does this by conjointly signalling interested system components about detected suspicious 
events, and thereby enabling them to take defensive actions wherever appropriate, and also by 
referring such events to System Security Officers (SSOs) for analysis and possible external 
remedial action. Such methods are intended to prevent attacks from being successful, and 
thereby preventing intrusions. 
MAFTIA also defines a methodology for combining different Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) services for enabling increased coverage and protection against attacks and intrusions, 
and, in this way, correlating the results of different IDS detection mechanisms to determine 
common system attacks and their potential intrusions (see Chapter 4 of [Dacier 2002]). 
Group communication protocols – aimed at combining classical fault tolerance techniques 
with design and implementation diversity.   
Using a group (or multiple groups) of functionally equivalent replicas is a classical method 
for achieving fault tolerant systems [Schneider 1990, Chérèque et al. 1992]. It is a method of 
redundancy that provides some protection against accidental (independent) replica failures as 
long as the correctly functioning membership of a group does not fall beneath the threshold 
necessary to ensure resilience to failure. This model is based on the assumption that faults 
occur independently of one another, affecting all replicas of a group with similar probability. 
For random and uncorrelated faults within a system, as well as those induced externally, but 
not maliciously, this assumption seems to be acceptable. 
However, faults induced by the malicious acts of an attacker may not always match this 
assumption. This makes it problematical to use simple replication-based groups in adversarial 
environments. For example, if all replicas have a common vulnerability that permits an 
attacker to violate the integrity of the system as a whole, the effective working of the system 
can be easily compromised. The independence assumption applies here only to the extent that 
the effort required to break into each machine is the same. With sophisticated “hacking” 
techniques, this assumption becomes increasingly difficult to justify, especially in view of the 
daily-reported, large-scale, coordinated system attacks via the Internet. 
MAFTIA has explored two different approaches to building intrusion-tolerant group 
communication protocols. The first approach [Cachin 2001] is to use a linear secret sharing 
scheme based on a generalised adversary structure that can model a more realistic set of fault 
assumptions. Replicas are classified according to one or more sets of attributes, and it is 
assumed that the characteristics of corrupting a replica vary according to these attributes. 
Suitable attributes include physical location, logical domain, system management personnel; 
type of operating system, protocol implementation, etc. Using an appropriately weighted 
linear secret sharing scheme, it is possible to construct protocols that can withstand the 
simultaneous corruption of all replicas in a given attribute class. For example, if the servers 
varied according to physical location and type of operating system, it would be possible to 
design a protocol that could tolerate the corruption of all the servers at a given site, and all the 
servers running a particular operating system.  
The second approach [Neves & Veríssimo 2002] that MAFTIA has explored to constructing 
intrusion-tolerant group communication protocols is based on the use of a Trusted Timely 
Computing Base (TTCB). A TTCB is a trusted system component that can be used to provide 
timeliness and fail-silence properties in a hostile environment. Thus, the TTCB must be 
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implemented in a way that ensures its trustworthiness, perhaps by using a tamper proof 
hardware artefact with strict administrative control. Using a TTCB, it is possible to implement 
a reliable broadcast protocol that can tolerate up to f failures of f+2 replicas. 
Using intrusion-tolerant group communication protocols, it is possible to construct Trusted 
Third Party services (TTPs) such as Certification Authorities, Fair Exchange, Notary, 
Authentication, and Authorisation [Abghour et al. 2001, Cachin 2002].  
Cryptographic techniques – aimed at ensuring that data is securely transmitted over 
insecure physical communication channels, and that data is securely protected on storage 
devices – all of this, of course, underpinned by the safe management of cryptographic keys. 
These techniques play a crucial role in the provision of effective identity and source of origin 
authorisation, safe cryptographic key management, and safeguards against misuse of data 
integrity and confidentiality of stored and communicated information. They are, therefore, the 
basic defenses against intrusions that might damage information integrity and privacy. 
MAFTIA’s use of cryptography in this regard is essentially three-fold: 
1) MAFTIA middleware provides reliable cryptographic communication protocols for 
single-cast message delivery; as well as reliable protocols for multi-cast, with causal 
and atomic properties for supporting single-valued and multi-valued Byzantine 
agreement.     
2) Threshold cryptography is used to distribute knowledge of the secret keys used for 
digital signatures and decryption. Using a threshold scheme, a secret is shared 
between n parties in such a way that at least t+1 of them must cooperate in order to 
decrypt messages or issue valid signatures. 
3) The MAFTIA Authorisation Service provides cryptographic capabilities and vouchers 
for authorised access to system resources/objects, as described later. 
Data fragmentation and scattering – aimed at making data difficult to interpret as useful 
information. 
Fragmentation-scattering [Fray et al. 1986] is an intrusion tolerance method that can be 
likened to redundancy in classical fault-tolerance contexts, where redundancy is used to 
ensure that the occurrence of a fault in one replica copy will be of no consequence to the 
correct functioning and integrity of other replica copies. Fragmentation is the process of 
separating data in a way that renders each fragment of no interest to an attacker due to its lack 
of useful information. Scattering refers to the way in which each fragment is isolated from the 
others. When both of these techniques are successfully applied to the data held by a system, 
an attacker is potentially disabled from collecting any useful information. The number of 
intrusions that can be tolerated without revealing any significant information is dependent on 
the degree of fragmentation and scattering used. This degree is a system parameter that can be 
chosen with regard to acceptable trade-offs between security and performance.  
Access control – aimed at regulating access to resources/objects according to the principles 
of “least privilege” and “need to know”. 
MAFTIA defines an intrusion-tolerant authorisation service that furnishes a scheme for 
granting permissions to each participant of a multiparty transaction, while distributing to each 
party only those permissions that are strictly needed to execute its own task [Abghour et al. 
2001, Abghour et al. 2002]. This scheme is based on two levels of protection: 
• A distributed authorisation server, in charge of granting or denying rights for 
operations involving one or more remote hosts. If such an operation is authorised, the 
authorisation server supplies all the necessary capabilities for the elementary 
operations needed to carry it out. 
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• A local reference monitor on each participating host, which is responsible for fine-
grain authorisation, and is designed to enforce local access controls and restrict access 
to local resources by remote objects by intercepting remote method invocations and 
checking the capabilities that accompany each request. To ensure intrusion tolerance, 
critical parts of this security may be implemented using tamper-proof hardware on 
each participating host (e.g. a Java Card, which of course must be safely guarded by 
its authorised administrator). 
The authorisation service is composed of replicated and diverse servers (operated by 
independent non-colluding system personnel), so that any single fault or intrusion can be 
tolerated without degrading the service. Confidential authorisation data (access control 
matrix) is fragmented, replicated and scattered across the servers. In order to reconstruct the 
data, multiple servers must co-operate. This means that as long as only a minority of the 
replicas are compromised, there is no loss of confidentiality of private data. 
The local reference monitor, supported by a safe distributed signature algorithm, controls 
access to local application resources. If it is compromised then the effect of the failure is 
localised. For its safety and integrity, its essential key management facilities should be 
contained in tamper-proof hardware (e.g. a Java smartcard under the strict controls of its 
legitimate human administration.)  
Transaction error confinement – aimed at providing error confinement by encapsulating 
multiple actions within a transaction that provides atomicity, consistency, isolation and 
durability. 
MAFTIA defines an intrusion-tolerant transaction service that is implemented using 
replicated transaction managers and resource managers that communicate using Byzantine 
agreement protocols, built on top of the TTCB. The transaction service can be used for error 
confinement at the application level.  
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Chapter 3 Analysis of a MAFTIA application 
The purpose of this chapter is to show how MAFTIA’s intrusion tolerance capabilities can be 
deployed to protect a realistic application (TRADEZONE) from malicious attacks, thus 
demonstrating how the various mechanisms provided by MAFTIA can be used to achieve 
intrusion tolerance. In order to analyse MAFTIA’s intrusion tolerance capabilities, fault trees 
are used to describe a representative set of hypothetical attacks, showing how an attacker 
(Malice) might attempt to intrude upon a MAFTIA-compliant TRADEZONE application. The 
fault trees illustrate the series of MAFTIA mechanisms that an attacker must successively 
overcome in order to achieve their objective, and the difficulty of achieving each step in the 
process is discussed as part of the fault tree analysis.  
It is important to note that the analysis has only been performed at a conceptual or 
architectural level, and is by no means complete. It would not be feasible within the 
constraints of the MAFTIA project to build a real application using MAFTIA mechanisms, 
and perform a complete security analysis. However, the analysis is sufficient for its primary 
purpose, which is to illustrate the potential of MAFTIA’s intrusion tolerance capabilities. 
3.1 TRADEZONE application scenario 
The overall application domain of TRADEZONE has the following characteristics: 
• Electronic purchasing of goods and services that can either (a) be represented in 
catalogue form (i.e., definable product types and attributes), or (b) can be defined by a 
request for quotation / tender workflow. 
• A domain with three principal actors (see Figure 1): 
• Purchasers – individuals and corporate groups of individuals requisitioning, 
approving, placing orders, tracking fulfilment and making payments. 
• Suppliers – creating and managing product information, customer account classes 
and pricing, processing and completing orders, responding to tenders. 
• TRADEZONE – serving as a broker between the purchaser and supplier of goods 
and their banks, together with other 3rd party marketplace sites that facilitate all 
ancillary services associated with e-commerce activities. 
 
Figure 1: TRADEZONE application domains 
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Purchasers are able to source and order products through a custom browser window accessing 
their approved suppliers, and through a supplier’s web site directly. There is a range of 
approval, management and reporting functions supporting the procurement process. Suppliers 
use a cataloguing system to create and maintain their product information, and define 
different account classes with specific pricing. They collect orders online and process through 
to fulfilment. 
Market operators facilitate trading between partners in specific sectors (e.g., Internet portal 
businesses are typical customers). They attract suppliers and purchasers to the market, and 
can also import existing suppliers’ catalogues where relevant. But the service as seen by an 
individual supplier or purchaser remains a one-to-one channel between themselves and each 
purchaser or supplier with whom they have a business relationship, i.e., it is not normally a 
public market where all suppliers are visible (although it can be). 
The application scenario for this analysis examines the transaction protocols for placement of 
orders and supply of goods, within the context of a TRADEZONE system. The role of the 
TRADEZONE system is to provide a secure and trustworthy market place, and manage the 
sequence of steps involved in ordering, supplying, and paying for goods in a secure and 
trustworthy fashion, thus enabling suppliers to supply goods to purchasers, confident that they 
will receive payment in due course. 
3.2 TRADEZONE security policy 
As discussed in Chapter 3 of [Powell & Stroud 2003], a security policy can be thought of as 
comprising both goals and rules and we draw a distinction between these. Goals are intended 
to capture the high-level security requirements and as such any violation of the goals 
constitutes a security failure. In contrast, rules are typically lower level constraints on the 
system behaviour that are designed to ensure that the system is robust against (possibly 
malicious) faults. Violations of the rules will typically not correspond to security failures but 
correspond to erroneous states in which the system is more prone to failure.  
3.2.1 Security goals 
The high-level security goals of the TRADEZONE security policy are to provide a secure, 
and timely transaction service: 
• Purchasers should be correctly charged for goods they receive.  
• Suppliers should receive correct payment for goods supplied.  
• Suppliers should dispatch goods in a timely fashion once an order has been accepted. 
• Purchasers should confirm receipt of goods in a timely fashion. 
• Banks should process payment requests and post confirmation signals in a timely 
fashion. 
• The integrity and availability of supplier catalogues should be assured. 
• All transactions should remain confidential. 
3.2.2 Security rules 
In order to achieve these security goals, the TRADEZONE application will be designed to 
enforce security rules such as the following:  
• A registered purchaser should have read access to all the catalogues. 
• A registered supplier should only have write access to their own catalogue. 
• All communications should be authenticated and logged by TRADEZONE. 
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• All messages must be authenticated and encrypted and should follow the transaction 
protocol steps, outlined in section 3.3 below. 
3.2.3 Security failures 
A security failure will occur if one of the security goals of the TRADEZONE application is 
violated. For example: 
• A supplier receives payment for which there is no corresponding delivery of goods. 
• Goods are delivered but the supplier does not receive payment. 
Such failures could be due to flaws in the formulation or implementation of the security rules, 
allowing someone to fake order and receipt messages for example. Alternatively, the failure 
of an authentication mechanism might allow fake messages to be introduced into the system. 
Finally, failures could be due to a fault in the architectural assumptions. For example, the 
implementation of trusted channels might be flawed, allowing fake payment messages to be 
inserted into the system, or the authorisation mechanisms might be bypassable. 
In the analysis that follows, we will consider the various ways in which the MAFTIA 
mechanisms protect against such failures. 
3.3 TRADEZONE transaction protocol 
For the purposes of our analysis, we will ignore the registration and catalogue management 
issues and simply deal with the correct unfolding of the TRADEZONE transactional protocol 
between a purchaser and a supplier. 
A registered purchaser (P) logs on, and once authenticated, is granted read access to the 
TRADEZONE (TZ) catalogue. She can now place an order for the goods. On receipt of an 
authorised order, TZ relays it to the appropriate supplier (S). S may now choose either to 
accept or reject the order. We will assume that S accepts the order and sends an “accept” 
message back to TZ, which TZ then logs and relays back to P. S then sends the goods. On 
receipt of the correct goods, P sends a receipt message to TZ, which then issues a payment 
order to P’s bank (PB). P’s bank arranges the transfer of funds to S’s bank (SB) and sends P a 
confirmation message. SB also sends a message to S confirming that the payment has been 
received, thus completing the process. 
Logically, the protocol involves the following steps: 
1) P→TZ: purchaseGoods (P, S, GoodsId: x) 
2) TZ → S: orderGoods (P, S, GoodsId: x) 
3) S → TZ: acceptOrder (P, S, GoodsId: x) or reject 
4) TZ → P: ack (P, S, GoodsId: x) 
5) [S → P: deliver item x] 
6) P → TZ: sendReceipt (P, S, GoodsId: x) 
7) TZ → PB: makePayment (P, S, GoodsId:x) 
8) [PB → SB: payment for x] 
9) PB → P: confirmPayment (P, S, GoodsId:x) 
10) SB → S: confirmPayment (P, S, GoodsId:x) 
The TRADEZONE application would be responsible for ensuring that these steps were 
performed reliably and securely in the correct sequence. Thus, a MAFTIA version of the 
TRADEZONE application would make use of the services provided by MAFTIA 
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mechanisms such as the Transaction Manager and the Authorisation Server to provide this 
guarantee, but these additional interactions are not shown here. For example, each of the 
above steps would be allowed for the enacting parties if, and only if, the MAFTIA 
authorisation server had issued them with the necessary permissions. Similarly, interactions 
with the MAFTIA transaction manager would be used to ensure that these steps were 
performed reliably and atomically. 
3.4 TRADEZONE in a MAFTIA setting 
Figure 2 illustrates a possible implementation of the TRADEZONE application built using 
MAFTIA architectural principles. Although not shown, it is assumed that TRADEZONE and 
the banks communicate via secure channels. 
 
Figure 2: TRADEZONE in a MAFTIA setting 
This setting represents both a logical and physical system configuration. The logical 
configuration identifies the interactions between components. The physical configuration 
shows the relationship between single site purchasers and suppliers (here only two are 
shown), the multi-site Authorization Service (AS), the multi-site Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) and System Security Officers (SSOs), and the TRADEZONE service with its 
transaction and resource managers. The secure channels between the systems form a Virtual 
Private Network (VPN), implemented using a well-known standard such as IPSec. However, 
MAFTIA mechanisms are used to enhance the security capabilities of the services provided 
over the Internet. All multi-site services use replication and fault masking to achieve intrusion 
tolerance. The Authorization service uses probabilistic asynchronous Byzantine Agreement 
protocols, and depends on design diversity to achieve failure independence. The 
TRADEZONE services are replicated, using the TTCB to construct a trusted channel between 
the servers that is tamper-proof by design. 
Server
Domain
protected by
firewall S
IDS Sensor
Resource
Manager
S
Control
network
Tradezone
Authorisation
Server
Authorisation Service
Event
Analyser
Supplier Purchaser
Internet
SmartcardClient Threshold
Crypto
Secure
Channels
Internet
SSO
S
Transaction
Manager
S
 Architectural Analysis of MAFTIA’s Intrusion Tolerance Capabilities 
 13 
In order to be enabled for secure operation, each distributed site (host) must be associated 
with a MAFTIA issued smartcard containing the security keys needed for secure 
communication and authorisation.   
3.5 Attack scenarios 
3.5.1 Introduction  
The following sections present a representative, although by no means exhaustive, set of 
informal attack scenarios that are intended to illustrate the difficulties that face an attacker 
(Malice) trying to effect successful intrusions upon the TRADEZONE application.  
The scenarios apply the technique of fault forecasting to demonstrate the role of MAFTIA in 
the provision of a more secure system than a traditional IPSec approach. Note that a standard 
IPSec approach only provides confidentiality of communications, and thus IPSec forms a 
subset of MAFTIA’s overall approach to achieving intrusion tolerance. 
We use the notation of fault trees to describe the various attack scenarios. Fault trees are used 
in hazard analysis where each hazard is a situation in which there is actual or potential danger 
to people or to the environment [Storey 1996]. Fault tree analysis starts with an event directly 
related to an identified hazard and works backwards to determine possible causes. Each event 
in the tree may have child events that are combined together with logical operations such as 
AND and OR. Fault trees may also be linked to each other, where the top-level event of one 
tree may be a bottom-level event of another tree. 
The security engineering community use a similar technique called attack trees. In an attack 
tree, the events are goals and the leaf nodes are ways of achieving the goals [Schneier 1996]. 
The tree can be annotated with measures of risk, and the overall risk of the root event 
occurring can be calculated by traversing the tree and combining risks according to functions 
associated with the logical operations. For example, assuming independent probabilities can 
be assigned to leaf nodes, the root node probability can be calculated by adding probabilities 
connected by OR operators, and multiplying together probabilities connected by AND 
operators. In our approach, however, we present a less rigorous intuitive measure of these 
risks, expressed in terms of value judgements about the effectiveness of MAFTIA’s intrusion 
tolerant capabilities.  
An overview of the notation used in our analysis is shown in the figure below. 
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Figure 3: Graphical notation used for fault trees 
Note that we distinguish MAFTIA fault events from IPSec fault events and others. To this 
end, we use different shadings. And in this regard, MAFTIA fault events correspond to 
failures of MAFTIA’s intrusion tolerance capabilities.  
As part of our analysis of each event, we discuss some of the assumptions that must hold for 
the correct functioning of MAFTIA-compliant system services. 
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3.5.2 Overview 
The overview shown in Figure 4 depicts the top-level fault tree for our attack scenarios. We 
assume that the attacker, Malice, has successfully registered as a legitimate supplier with 
TRADEZONE. Malice is thus a corrupt insider. The root event in our fault tree occurs if 
Malice succeeds in illegally making money whilst avoiding detection. In order to make 
money illegally, Malice must either steal money from her competitors directly, or else gain an 
unfair advantage over them by manipulating the market within TRADEZONE in some way 
(for example, Malice could masquerade as a purchaser and reserve all her competitors’ stock, 
so that she was the only supplier able to fulfil new orders). 
Each of the leaf events shown in Figure 4 has its own attack/fault tree, which is described in 
more detail in a subsequent section. 
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Figure 4: High level fault tree 
3.5.3 Malice steals money 
We consider three ways in which Malice could steal money from purchasers: 
• She receives money from a purchaser to which she is not entitled 
The TRADEZONE application is supposed to ensure that the steps in the transaction 
protocol are followed in the correct sequence. Thus, TRADEZONE will only issue 
payment instructions for goods on completion of an order. To receive payment illegally, 
Malice must forge a sendReceipt request from a purchaser for goods that she has not 
delivered. The purchaser must either have legitimately ordered the goods from Malice, or 
else Malice must have forged the order as well. In order to forge a request, Malice must 
subvert the authorisation process. 
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• She receives money meant for another supplier 
To achieve this she must intercept and modify a legitimate purchaseGoods request from 
a purchaser, so that it names her as the recipient, issue this request to TRADEZONE, and 
then issue a sendReceipt request on behalf of the purchaser, causing payment to her. 
This is like the previous attack, but also requires Malice to break a secure channel 
between the legitimate supplier and TRADEZONE. 
• She subverts the TRADEZONE application entirely: 
In which case, she has complete control over the system, and can issue illegal payments to 
herself. However, in order to subvert TRADEZONE, she must successfully attack the 
replicated servers within TRADEZONE itself, which are linked by a trusted network, 
assumed to be tamper-proof by design. 
Note that we exclude the possibility that Malice can interact with the bank directly, because 
we assume that the channels between TRADEZONE and the banks are physically secure and 
not accessible to outsiders. (Note that Malice is an insider with respect to the TRADEZONE 
application domain, but an outsider with respect to the TRADEZONE administrative 
domain). 
The attack scenarios identified above are outlined in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5: Malice steals money 
In the first two cases, Malice must subvert the authorisation process and forge a 
purchaseGoods or sendReceipt operation with a correct but illegitimate proof of 
authorisation.  
In the third case, she must defeat the TRADEZONE transaction manager service, which is 
implemented using TTCB-based Byzantine atomic broadcast, i.e. depends on the use of a 
trusted network built from tamper-proof components. This would require her to subvert a 
trusted hardware component on at least f+1 out of f+2 servers to which she does not have 
physical access.  
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3.5.4 Malice subverts authorisation process 
If Malice is unable to overcome the TTCB-based protection of the TRADEZONE application, 
then she must subvert the MAFTIA authorisation service. This requires her to form acceptable 
operational requests that appear to come from target sites (in this case the purchaser’s sites) 
by inserting or modifying high-level operation requests (with valid vouchers), and thereby 
having them honoured by the TRADEZONE reference monitor. 
The cases considered are as follows. 
• Authorisation service compromised 
• Malice modifies the authorisation service’s access control matrix. 
• Malice forges illegal capabilities. 
 Authorised user impersonated 
• Malice steals the purchaser’s smartcard and obtains its PIN.  
• Malice forges a user’s smartcard. 
These cases are illustrated below, and discussed thereafter. Note that we do not consider the 
possibility that the authorisation mechanisms on the local host could be bypassed.1 This is 
reasonable because the authorisation scheme does not rely on the trustworthiness of other 
hosts, and thus, even if a particular host is corrupted, it cannot persuade a non-corrupted host 
to execute unauthorised operations on its behalf. (See [Abghour et al. 2002] for more details.) 
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Figure 6: Malice subverts authorisation process 
                                                     
1  Note that if the TRADEZONE server is considered to be a single host, an insider might be able to 
bypass the local reference monitor within TRADEZONE, and thus be able to run any unauthorized 
operation locally (e.g., fake purchase). However, this would be much more difficult if the 
TRADEZONE server was composed of dedicated hosts (e.g., catalogue, purchase request, invoice, 
delivery, etc.). In that case, even if one host is subverted, it would still not be possible (practically) 
for the attacker to realise a complete fake transaction. 
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Compromising the authorisation service so that Malice is able to obtain permissions to which 
she is not entitled can only be achieved if she either changes the access control matrix, or she 
subverts the asynchronous, time-free Byzantine agreement protocol used by the authorisation 
service, together with the threshold cryptographic protocol used to protect its secret key and 
thus its digital signatures. 
Changing the access control matrix could be achieved if either there is a conspiracy of 
sufficient system administrators working in Malice’s interest, or Malice can crack the 
threshold cryptography scheme used to scatter and encrypt the contents of the matrix. 
Administrator conspiracies are a social engineering problem that falls outside the technical 
jurisdiction of MAFTA, and so we do not consider this type of attack further.  
Breaking the matrix scatter and encryption scheme requires Malice to control and understand 
the programmed semantics of t+1 hosting sites, where t is the intrusion resilience threshold 
above which the intrusion tolerance of the access matrix fails. Malice would also need to 
overcome the distributed diversity of the hosting sites. All of this taken together is regarded as 
a non-trivial problem with sufficient work factors to deter the attacker.  
For Malice to obtain (forged) capabilities and vouchers, she needs to break the asynchronous 
Byzantine protocol of the authorisation service and crack the threshold cryptographic scheme 
for deriving the necessary secret key to sign capabilities and vouchers. The resilience of the 
authorisation service as a whole to attack depends on the underlying adversary structure, 
which assumes that servers are grouped together according to one or more sets of attribute 
values. The protocols can tolerate the failure of an entire set of servers within each attribute 
class (see [Cachin 2001] for more details). Again, host site diversity can also be brought into 
play to frustrate Malice.  
As an alternative to attacking the authorisation server, Malice could instead attempt to 
impersonate another authorised user by stealing or forging that user’s smartcard. The 
authorisation server can provide no guarantees about the behaviour of a compromised user, 
but it can prevent the compromised user from interfering with the activities of legitimate 
users. 
The security of a smartcard and its PIN is the responsibility of the authorised cardholder. Loss 
of the card and its PIN cannot be protected by MAFTIA’s technical defenses alone. The 
cardholder has two essential responsibilities in this respect: (i) to always keep the card in a 
safe place; and (ii) to never reveal its PIN. If, however, the card is stolen, then the MAFTIA-
compliant application (in this case, TRADEZONE) should require the cardholder to report its 
loss to the security administration as soon as possible so that the certificate for the card (held 
on the card itself and known by the authorisation service) can be revoked. Additionally, the 
PIN that enables the card to be authenticated to a local reference monitor must never be 
allowed to be given incorrectly more than, say, three times without being revoked. Such 
policies accord with standard ATM banking practice. Such a security policy will of course 
require cooperation between the logic on the card, the reference monitor on a host, the 
security administration, and the authentication service. 
The act of forging a smartcard is considerably more difficult than stealing an existing card. 
Although technical attacks on smart cards are known to exist (see for example, Chapter 14 of 
[Anderson 2001]), they are assumed to be beyond the resources of Malice. In any case, even if 
Malice were to be able to break into a smart card and steal the private keys it contained, she 
would still not be able to generate false permissions to access other MAFTIA hosts because 
this would require knowledge of the private key for the authentication server, which is not 
stored on the smart card [Abghour et al. 2002]. Rather than attempting to forge a smart card 
for an existing user, Malice would sensibly choose the easier option of stealing the card and 
deriving its PIN. However, in either case, before Malice was able to use the forged or stolen 
card, she would also have to defeat the certificate-based host authorisation mechanism used 
by the Java card, or gain physical access to her victim’s machine, which is another obstacle 
for her to overcome. 
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3.5.5 Malice gains an unfair advantage 
Instead of stealing money directly from her competitors, Malice could attempt to manipulate 
the TRADEZONE marketplace so as to ensure that her competitors cannot offer the same 
goods at a cheaper price. There are a number of possible ways that Malice (or an associate) 
might carry out such an attack, as illustrated below.  
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Figure 7: Malice gains unfair advantage 
For example, Malice might attempt to subvert the TRADEZONE protocol by acting as a 
purchaser (although she is not registered as one) and both starting a transaction and, within its 
context, attempting to reserve all the available stock of her rivals. To do this she must defeat 
MAFTIA’s authorisation service, as outlined earlier. In practice, a real TRADEZONE 
application should prevent a single purchaser from reserving all goods of a particular type 
offered by a supplier. However, Malice might attempt to work in concert with others in 
making this attack. 
Alternatively, Malice might legitimately register herself as a purchaser with TRADEZONE, 
perhaps using a forged identity, and then quite legitimately make the same attack. 
Interestingly, there is nothing in the TRADEZONE security policy stated above in Section 3.2 
to say that it is illegal for a supplier to also be a purchaser, and indeed, it might not be 
appropriate for TRADEZONE to impose such a restriction. However, without a clear 
separation of roles within TRADEZONE, this kind of abuse is possible, and cannot be 
prevented by solely technical means. 
Malice might also try to bring sufficient transaction manager replicas under her control such 
that the resource managers lock the goods and thereby prevent them from being offered by 
 Architectural Analysis of MAFTIA’s Intrusion Tolerance Capabilities 
 19 
suppliers. As the transaction manager service is implemented using TTCB-based Byzantine 
atomic broadcast, the correct operation of the transaction service depends upon the integrity 
of the local TTCBs and their control network, which are designed to function correctly in a 
hostile environment and assumed to be tamper-proof by design. Similarly, she might attempt 
to bring sufficient resource mangers under her control and cause them to inform clients that 
the goods required are unavailable for purchase, but again this would require her to defeat the 
TTCB-based Byzantine atomic broadcast, and the same obstacles would apply 
Other possibilities for this kind of attack, not considered here, would include attacks on the 
integrity of catalogues so as to manipulate the prices. This would involve either 
compromising the authorisation scheme or defeating the data fragmentation technique used by 
TRADEZONE to ensure the integrity of catalogues. 
3.5.6 Malice evades detection 
Malice would aim to avoid detection by the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) at least while 
she was carrying out her activities. This could be achieved either by corrupting the event 
analysers and thus preventing the IDS from correctly detecting her attack, or else by ensuring 
that events associated with her activities were not collected in the first place.  
An example attack tree follows. Note that we only consider technical attacks on the IDS, and 
do not consider the possibility that Malice could successfully conceal her activities by 
masquerading as a legitimate user. 
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Figure 8: Malice evades detection 
There are several ways in which Malice could prevent the correct correlation of events. She 
could either subvert the time free Byzantine agreement protocols used to ensure robustness 
against attack, hide events related to her attacks amongst false positives, corrupt 
communications with the sensors that provide the events for analysis, or allow events to be 
received but ensure that they are not correlated correctly by corrupting the correlation 
algorithm. 
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The steps for subverting agreement protocols were discussed earlier. Hiding attacks amongst 
false positives would require the data mining algorithms used by the IDS to eliminate false 
positives to be subverted so that events related to an attack were removed from the analysis. 
One approach might be to install faulty equipment that generates the same events as used by 
Malice for her attack, and then use the same machines to perform the attack. Subverting the 
secure channels between sensors and the event analyser requires subverting standard IPSec 
protection, which we do not consider further. Ensuring that events are not correlated correctly 
could result from simple design faults or some form of social engineering attack that we do 
not consider within the scope of the MAFTIA project. 
Ensuring that sensors do not detect attacks could mean that Malice has chosen an attack that 
does not register with the sensors, there is a denial-of-service attack on the sensors, or all 
sensor implementations are modified. A denial-of-service attack can be achieved should 
Malice gain sufficient privilege on the host where the sensor is resident, and she kills both the 
sensor and the watchdog process that is intended to restart it after it is killed2. Alternatively 
Malice could mount a denial-of-service by flooding the network or physically disconnecting 
the sensors. However, denial of service attacks and sensor modification is made more difficult 
by sensor replication, distribution and host site diversity. 
                                                     
2  In general, we would expect it to be more difficult for an outsider to kill the watchdog process 
because, unlike the sensor, the watchdog does not provide an interface that is accessible over the 
network. 
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Chapter 4 Discussion 
As show by the analysis in the previous chapter, MAFTIA provides a variety of mechanisms 
that can be used in combination to construct intrusion-tolerant systems. An intrusion-tolerant 
system must be able to continue to deliver a secure service, despite the presence of intrusions, 
and thus, a “defence in depth” strategy is needed so as to avoid depending on any particular 
component of the system that could become a single point of failure. In this chapter, we 
highlight some of the key concepts and ideas underpinning MAFTIA’s approach towards 
achieving intrusion tolerance, as illustrated by the scenarios discussed in the previous chapter. 
4.1 Preventing errors from leading to security failures 
MAFTIA Deliverable D21 [Powell & Stroud 2003] introduces the classical dependability 
concepts of fault, error, and failure, and shows how they may be applied to reasoning about 
prevention and tolerance mechanisms aimed at ensuring system security. An error is the 
manifestation of a fault on the system state, and a failure is the manifestation of an error on 
the service delivered to the system user. An error can have multiple causes. In particular, an 
error that could result in a security failure is not necessarily the result of a malicious fault – 
such an error could also result from an accidental fault. This is the reason that MAFTIA 
defines intrusion detection as the detection of errors that can result in security failure rather 
than the detection of errors that result from intrusions. However, regardless of the cause, the 
system is still liable to failure unless some step is taken to remove the error from the system.  
MAFTIA’s approach to error handling is to use error compensation techniques based on 
active replication and masking. Thus, Byzantine agreement protocols are at the heart of the 
intrusion tolerance mechanisms provided by MAFTIA. However, even though Byzantine 
agreement protocols are designed to deal with arbitrary faults in the value and time domain, 
they still assume failure independence. In the presence of malicious faults and deliberate 
attacks on systems, this is not a reasonable assumption, and MAFTIA must therefore take 
steps to address this problem by designing protocols that can tolerate more realistic failure 
assumptions, and by ensuring that compromising one replica does not make it any easier to 
compromise another. The standard way of achieving failure independence is to make some 
assumption about diversity, and thus, various forms of diversity are an important part of any 
intrusion tolerance strategy. As an additional intrusion tolerance strategy, MAFTIA also seeks 
to minimise the extent to which different parts of the system are trusted, so as to make it 
harder for the effects of a successful intrusion to propagate throughout the system. This is an 
example of error confinement. 
It is worth discussing briefly two other possible methods of error handling, namely forward 
and backward error recovery. In principle, these techniques could also be used for intrusion 
tolerance, but in practice, this is not straightforward for at least two reasons. Firstly, both 
methods depend on a reliable error detection mechanism, but despite the progress made by 
MAFTIA in this area, building a reliable IDS is still an open research area. However, without 
the ability to detect errors correctly with a high probability, it is not possible to build a reliable 
fault tolerance mechanism based on an unreliable error detection mechanism. Secondly, any 
state-based recovery mechanism must deal with the problem of latency of error detection and 
the possibility that the intruder could have concealed their activities for a long time, or spread 
them throughout the system. Once an intrusion is discovered, it can be a very difficult and 
time-consuming process to construct (or re-construct) a system state that is free from the 
effects of the intrusion. Thus, with the current state of the art in intrusion detection, it would 
seem that error handling approaches based on error compensation are the only viable way of 
building intrusion tolerant systems at present. 
Malicious- and Accidental- Fault Tolerance for Internet Applications  
 22 
4.2 Using active replication to achieve error compensation 
MAFTIA has explored two different approaches to implementing error compensation 
mechanisms using active replication. Both depend on the use of Byzantine Agreement 
protocols that are capable of tolerating malicious faults and provide some degree of failure 
independence. However, the failure assumptions are different. 
The first approach is based on the use of hybrid failure assumptions, which support the 
construction of systems from a mixture of trusted and untrusted components. However, 
components are only trusted to the extent of their trustworthiness. Thus, steps must be taken 
to increase the trustworthiness of each trusted component. MAFTIA has developed a set of 
partially timed Byzantine Agreement protocols based on the use of a trusted component called 
the TTCB. The TTCB is a distributed security kernel that uses a dedicated control network to 
provide strong guarantees about timeliness and failure. The TTCB component installed on 
each MAFTIA host is assumed to be tamperproof and fail-silent by design. One approach to 
achieving this is to use physical isolation techniques and special hardware. Thus, the TTCB is 
able to support the correct execution of Byzantine agreement protocols, even in the presence 
of malicious faults. Furthermore, because it is assumed that a TTCB cannot be compromised, 
it is possible for a TTCB group to support a reliable broadcast protocol with f+2 replicas, 
requiring an attacker to compromise f+1 TTCB servers in order to effect an intrusion. Thus, 
for the same number of replicas, a TTCB-based system can tolerate a larger number of 
intrusions than a more traditional approach (which normally require 3f+1 replicas to tolerate f 
failures). However, it is still necessary to ensure failure independence using diversity 
techniques, otherwise, an attacker might be able to exploit a common vulnerability and 
intrude upon a set of replicas with reduced effort. 
The TTCB approach towards constructing intrusion-tolerant Byzantine Agreement protocols 
is based on the recursive application of fault prevention and fault tolerance techniques. Fault 
prevention techniques are used to build a trustworthy TTCB, which can then be used to 
support the execution of fault-tolerant protocols. In contrast, the other approach that MAFTIA 
has developed for implementing Byzantine Agreement protocols does not make any 
assumptions about the trustworthiness of individual components or hosts. There are no fail 
silence assumptions or timeliness guarantees. Instead, cryptographic algorithms are used to 
implement an efficient, probabilistic, Byzantine Agreement protocol in an asynchronous 
setting. These protocols assume a generalised adversary structure, in which replicas are 
classified according to one or more independent sets of attributes. Assuming that there are at 
least four different values for each attribute, it is possible to design protocols that can tolerate 
the simultaneous failure of a complete set of replicas in each attribute class. Again, it is 
necessary to make assumptions about failure independence, but the protocols are designed to 
tolerate a limited number of common failures with a more realistic set of failure assumptions. 
In order to successfully attack these protocols, an attacker must either break the diversity 
assumption and compromise a sufficient number of hosts, or else break the underlying 
cryptographic algorithms on which the protocols are based. See [Cachin 2001] for a precise 
formulation of the failure model. 
4.3 Approaches towards achieving error confinement 
An important part of realising a “defence in depth” strategy is to accept that components of 
the system can be compromised, and minimise the extent to which they are trusted by other 
components of the system. Thus, error confinement strategies are an important part of 
achieving intrusion tolerance.  
There are many examples of such strategies within MAFTIA. For example, Threshold 
Cryptography schemes are used extensively for secret sharing. A threshold scheme shares a 
secret between n parties in such a way that at least t+1 shares are required in order to use the 
secret, for example, to generate a digital signature or to decrypt a message. Thus, no party is 
 Architectural Analysis of MAFTIA’s Intrusion Tolerance Capabilities 
 23 
trusted with the entire secret or is able to reconstruct the secret, and consequently, the system 
is able to tolerate a limited number of intrusions, up to the threshold parameter t. 
Similarly, the MAFTIA Authorisation Scheme is designed for Internet applications, in which 
hosts are mutually suspicious of each other. Although Java Cards are used to implement a 
local security kernel on each host, and it is assumed that it would be very difficult for an 
attacker to access or forge the cryptographic keys stored on the Java Card, even if the attacker 
were to succeed in compromising the Java Card in this way, it would still not be possible for 
the intrusion to propagate beyond the local host. This is because a faulty host cannot generate 
false permissions for other MAFTIA hosts without knowing the private key of the 
Authorisation Server, which is protected by a Threshold Signature scheme. 
As a final example, there are various ways in which the alarm signals generated by the 
sensors deployed by an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) could be compromised or 
manipulated by an attacker, and an intrusion tolerant IDS needs to protect against these kinds 
of attack. [Dacier 2002] discusses a number of strategies for building an intrusion tolerant 
IDS, some of which could be viewed as error confinement mechanisms that seek to reduce the 
amount of trust that an IDS puts in any particular sensor. For example, event correlation 
techniques or the use of diverse IDS implementations that respond to a given attack in 
different ways can be regarded intrusion tolerance strategies that exploit diversity in order to 
build a more trustworthy distributed IDS out of IDSs that are individually untrustworthy. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions and future research 
This report has presented a summary of MAFTIA’s approach towards building intrusion 
tolerant systems, and demonstrated its effectiveness by constructing an architectural model of 
a small but realistic use case based on an e-commerce application. Fault trees have been used 
to analyse a representative but by no means exhaustive set of attacks on this model, and thus 
highlight the obstacles that an attacker must overcome in order to defeat MAFTIA’s intrusion 
tolerance mechanisms and intrude upon the application. 
The analysis was designed to illustrate and highlight a number of key design principles for 
building intrusion tolerant systems. These include: the use of a “defence in depth” strategy, 
the notion of trusting components to the extent of their trustworthiness but no more, measures 
to increase trust such as the use of Byzantine agreement protocols, and measures to decrease 
the reliance on trust such as the use of error confinement mechanisms to prevent intrusions 
from propagating throughout a system. Detailed discussions of all of these models and 
techniques can be found in the relevant MAFTIA deliverables. 
Because of the difficulties of building reliable error detection mechanisms in a hostile 
environment and the problems posed for state based error recovery methods by long latency 
of error detection and malicious dormant faults, MAFTIA has concentrated on achieving 
intrusion tolerance using error compensation mechanisms based on masking. However, the 
success of these measures depends on failure independence assumptions, which are typically 
based upon claims about diversity. Thus, three important areas for future research are: 
developing techniques for ensuring and measuring diversity in the presence of arbitrary 
malicious faults, improving the quality of error detection mechanisms so as to make state-
based error recovery techniques feasible as a means of intrusion tolerance, and finally, finding 
solutions to the problems of long latency of error detection and malicious dormant faults. 
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